Created by the joint initiative of the Politics Department, the Economics Department, and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, the Research Program in Political Economy (RPPE) supports scholarship at the intersection of economics and political science.
Designed to facilitate greater interaction across departments at Princeton as well as with the broader disciplines, the program sponsors research workshops and colloquia, conferences, short-term visits to Princeton by scholars who work in political economy, and grants to students to aid their research in political economy.
JMP: "Policy Decay and the Determinants of Gridlock"
Interest groups contribute much less to campaigns than legally allowed. Consequently, prevailing theories infer these contributions must yield minimal returns. I argue constraints on PAC fundraising may also explain why interest groups give little.
I study a model of legislative policymaking with interest groups. To lobby, groups must have access. Access provides opportunities to lobby particular legislators when they control the agenda. In equilibrium, persistent access creates a tradeoff. It changes legislature-wide expectations, thereby affecting which policies pass today.