I study a model of legislative policymaking with interest groups. To lobby, groups must have access. Access provides opportunities to lobby particular legislators when they control the agenda. In equilibrium, persistent access creates a tradeoff. It changes legislature-wide expectations, thereby affecting which policies pass today.
Created by the joint initiative of the Politics Department, the Economics Department, and the Woodrow Wilson School, the Research Program in Political Economy (RPPE) supports scholarship at the intersection of economics and political science.
Designed to facilitate greater interaction across departments at Princeton as well as with the broader disciplines, the program sponsors research workshops and colloquia, conferences, short-term visits to Princeton by scholars who work in political economy, and grants to students to aid their research in political economy.
Gleason Judd: Access and Lobbying in Legislatures
Mica Sviatschi: Making a Gangster
This paper provides new evidence on how criminal skills exported from the US affect gang development in El Salvador and child migration to the US. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act drastically increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs that developed in Los Angeles...
Germán Gieczewski: Policy Persistence and Drift in Organizations
I analyze the evolution of organizations that allow free entry and exit of members, such as cities, trade unions, sports clubs and cooperatives. Current members choose a policy for the organization, but this, in turn, may lead to new agents joining or dissatisfied members leaving, yielding a new set of policymakers tomorrow.
RPPE Visitors: Kristof MadaraszMon, Sep 23, 2019 (All day) to Fri, Sep 27, 2019 (All day)
PEW: Kristóf MadaraszMon, Sep 23, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pmLocation: 127 Corwin HallSpeaker(s):
PE Research Seminar: Simon LazarusTue, Sep 24, 2019, 12:15 pmLocation: Fisher 200Speaker(s):