@article{112,
  keywords = {Political Science, Elections, Theory, Civil war, Developing countries--LDCs, Society, Separation of powers},
  author = {Leonard Wantchekon},
  title = {The Paradox of "Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation},
  abstract = {Political theorists from Machiavelli to Huntington have denied the possibility of popular government arising out of the chaos of civil war, instead prescribing an intermediate stage of one-man rule by a Prince, Leviathan, or a military dictator. Based on recent empirical evidence of post-civil war democratization in El Salvador, Mozambique, and elsewhere, I show that democracy can arise directly from anarchy. Predatory warring factions choose the citizenry and democratic procedures over a Leviathan when (1) their economic interests depend on productive investment by the citizens, (2) citizens{\textquoteright} political preferences ensure that power allocation will be less biased under democracy than under a Leviathan, and (3) there is an external agency (e.g., the United Nations) that mediates and supervises joint disarmament and state-building. Ultimately, I discuss the implications of this argument for the basic intuitions of classical political theory and contemporary social theory regarding democratization and authoritarianism. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {The American Political Science Review},
  volume = {98},
  pages = { - 33},
  month = {Feb 2004},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  address = {Washington},
  isbn = {00030554},
  url = {https://search.proquest.com/docview/214419996?accountid=13314},
  note = {plain_text},
  language = {eng},
}