@article{174,
  keywords = {Equilibrium, Information, Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design (D82), Games, Noncooperative Games (C72), Two Player, Equilibria},
  author = {Sandeep Baliga and Stephen Morris},
  title = {Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk},
  abstract = {We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information.},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {105},
  pages = { - 468},
  month = {August 2002},
  isbn = {0022-0531, 0022-0531},
  url = {https://search.proquest.com/docview/56049463?accountid=13314},
  note = {plain_text},
  language = {eng},
}