In "Endogenous Parliaments: The Domestic and International Roots of Long-Term Economic Growth and Executive Constraints in Europe", Carles Boix studies economic and political development over the long span of European history from 1200 to 1900.
In "Lobbying and Policy Extremism in Repeated Elections", Gleason Judd studies a model of repeated elections that features privately informed politicians and ideologically extreme lobby groups.
In "Bargaining and Strategic Voting on Appellate Courts" Chuck Cameron studies how appellate courts and regulatory commissions produce case dispositions and rules rationalizing the dispositions.
JMP: "Do States Screen or Signal?"
JMP: "Policy Decay and the Determinants of Gridlock"
Interest groups contribute much less to campaigns than legally allowed. Consequently, prevailing theories infer these contributions must yield minimal returns. I argue constraints on PAC fundraising may also explain why interest groups give little.
I study a model of legislative policymaking with interest groups. To lobby, groups must have access. Access provides opportunities to lobby particular legislators when they control the agenda. In equilibrium, persistent access creates a tradeoff. It changes legislature-wide expectations, thereby affecting which policies pass today.
This paper provides new evidence on how criminal skills exported from the US affect gang development in El Salvador and child migration to the US. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act drastically increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs that developed in Los Angeles...