JMP: "Policy Decay and the Determinants of Gridlock"
Gridlock has become an increasingly salient feature of policy-making, especially in the U.S. This paper contributes to the study of legislative gridlock by analyzing a dynamic model of two-party bargaining in which status-quo policies and electoral outcomes are both endogenous. I introduce a key object of the analysis, foresight horizon, to index the number of downstream, future agreements politicians incorporate into their decision-making on current policy. Characterizing the unique equilibrium, I find that when proposal power is endogenized, gridlock is a feature of equilibrium if and only if the foresight horizon is finite. While temporal discounting and the foresight horizon both measure a kind of "patience," they affect gridlock in different ways. While limited foresight engenders gridlock, greater discounting helps politicians arrive at agreement more easily.
Read the paper here.
Learn more about Parth here.