How could power imbalance lead to war? How could power imbalance allow for mutual optimism? I analyze these questions using a formal model of incomplete information, where two parties bargain over two periods. I argue that power imbalance causes war because the strong party wishes to crush its weaker opponent, obviating the need for future…

How to successfully execute a coup? The literature has mostly focused on identifying the conditions under which coups happen and achieve durable regime change. In this paper, I show that the actions of conspirators during a coup matter and highlight the strategic importance of control over means of communications to deter the coordination of…

Negotiating factional conflict is crucial to successful policymaking. In these conflicts, actors sometimes employ hardball tactics to strategically rule out outcomes they dislike. Using a dynamic bargaining model, I explore how the threat and usage of these tactics impact coordination between actors with conflicting interests. In the model, two…