PEC: Jason Davis

Thu, Feb 7, 2019, 12:15 pm

War is commonly conceived of as the result of a bargaining process between states. However, war also has redistributive consequences within a state: certain groups face disproportionate costs (e.g. likely conscripts), while other groups may accrue most of the benefits (military contractors, politicians, etc.). War should thus be viewed simultaneously as the result of a bargaining process between domestic groups. This paper presents a two-level game in which the relative importance of different domestic groups to a government can impact the likelihood of going to war, but only under certain conditions. In particular, a necessary condition for domestic distributive politics to matter for war onset is the existence of what this paper calls “internal indivisibility problems”- i.e. bargaining frictions between domestic parties. This also allows the model to produce a new explanation for why war may occur despite the fact that it is Pareto inefficient: inability to costlessly redistribute value domestically between war’s beneficiaries and the beneficiaries of any peaceful bargain.

Location: 
Fisher Hall 200

Upcoming

Princeton/Warwick/Utah Political Economy Conference 2019

Sat, Mar 23, 2019 (All day) to Sun, Mar 24, 2019 (All day)

PEW: Gilat Levy

Mon, Mar 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PE Research Seminar: Korhan Kocak

Thu, Mar 28, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200

PEW: Guido Tabellini

Mon, Apr 8, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PE Research Seminar: Kathy Ingram

Thu, Apr 11, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200

PEW: Dorothy Kronick

Mon, Apr 15, 2019, 4:30 pm

PEW: Tim Besley

Tue, Apr 16, 2019, 12:45 pm
Location: 217 JRR

PE Research Seminar: Noam Reich

Thu, Apr 18, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200

PEW: Melissa Dell

Mon, Apr 22, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PE Research Seminar: Federico Huneeus

Thu, Apr 25, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200