PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 11, 2019, 4:30 pm

We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove that there always exists a stable allocation of votes that is reachable in a finite number of trades, for any number of voters and issues, any separable preference profile, and any restrictions on the coalitions that may form. If at every step all blocking trades are chosen with positive probability, convergence to a stable allocation occurs in finite time with probability one. If coalitions are unrestricted, the outcome of vote trading must be Pareto optimal, but unless there are three voters or two issues, it need not correspond to the Condorcet winner. If trading is farsighted, a non-empty set of stable vote allocations reachable from a starting vote allocation need not exist, and if it does exist it need not include the Condorcet winner, even in the case of two issues.



PEW: Matt Jackson

Mon, Sep 16, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Kristóf Madarasz

Mon, Sep 23, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Sara Lowes

Mon, Sep 30, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

RPPE Visitors: Ernesto Dal Bo

Wed, Oct 2, 2019 (All day) to Wed, Oct 9, 2019 (All day)

PEW: Karam Kang

Mon, Oct 14, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Nancy Qian

Mon, Nov 4, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW Camilo García-Jimeno

Mon, Dec 2, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Raquel Fernandez

Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Matt Gentzkow

Mon, Mar 2, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

Princeton/Warwick/Utah Political Economy Conference 2020

Fri, Mar 20, 2020, 9:00 am to Sat, Mar 21, 2020, 7:00 pm
Location: Rome, Italy