PEW: Georgy Egorov

Mon, Oct 1, 2018, 4:30 pm

A receiver wants to learn multidimensional information from a sender, but she has capacity to verify only one dimension. The sender’s payoff depends on the belief he induces, via an exogenously given monotone function. We show that by using a randomized verification strategy, the receiver can learn the sender’s information fully if the exogenous payoff function is submodular. If it is (strictly) supermodular, then full learning is not possible.

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Upcoming

PEC: Maria Micaela Sviatschi

Thu, Nov 29, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEW: Laurent Bouton

Mon, Dec 3, 2018, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEC: Brendan Cooley

Thu, Dec 6, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEC: Federico Huneeus

Thu, Dec 13, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 11, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Edward Glaeser

Mon, Feb 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Monica Martinez-Bravo

Mon, Mar 4, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Juan Ortner

Mon, Mar 11, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

Princeton/Warwick/Utah Political Economy Conference 2019

Sat, Mar 23, 2019 (All day) to Sun, Mar 24, 2019 (All day)

PEW: Gilat Levy

Mon, Mar 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall