PEW: Georgy Egorov

Mon, Oct 1, 2018, 4:30 pm

A receiver wants to learn multidimensional information from a sender, but she has capacity to verify only one dimension. The sender’s payoff depends on the belief he induces, via an exogenously given monotone function. We show that by using a randomized verification strategy, the receiver can learn the sender’s information fully if the exogenous payoff function is submodular. If it is (strictly) supermodular, then full learning is not possible.

Location: 
Speaker(s): 

Upcoming

PEW: Edward Glaeser

Mon, Feb 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PE Research Seminar: In Young Park

Thu, Feb 28, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200

PEW: Monica Martinez-Bravo

Mon, Mar 4, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PE Research Seminar: Dan Gibbs

Thu, Mar 7, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200

PEW: Juan Ortner

Mon, Mar 11, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PE Research Seminar: Matias Iaryczower

Thu, Mar 14, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200

Princeton/Warwick/Utah Political Economy Conference 2019

Sat, Mar 23, 2019 (All day) to Sun, Mar 24, 2019 (All day)

PEW: Gilat Levy

Mon, Mar 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PE Research Seminar: Korhan Kocak

Thu, Mar 28, 2019, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher 200

PEW: Guido Tabellini

Mon, Apr 8, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall