PEW: Gerard Padro-i-Miquel

Mon, Oct 22, 2018, 4:30 pm

 We propose a simple informational theory to explain why autocratic regimes introduce local elections. Because citizens have better information on local officials than the distant central government, delegation of authority via local elections improves selection and performance of local officials. However, local officials under elections have no incentive to implement unpopular centrally mandated policies. The model makes several predictions: i) elections pose a trade-off between performance and vertical control; ii) elections improve the selection of officials; and iii) an increase in bureaucratic capacity reduces the desirability of elections for the autocrat. To test (i) and (ii), we collect a large village-level panel dataset from rural China. Consistent with the model, we find that elections improve (weaken) the implementation of popular (unpopular) policies, and improve official selection. We provide a large body of qualitative and descriptive evidence to support (iii). In doing so, we shed light on why the Chinese government has systematically undermined village governments twenty years after they were introduced.

Location: 

Upcoming

PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 11, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Edward Glaeser

Mon, Feb 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Monica Martinez-Bravo

Mon, Mar 4, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Juan Ortner

Mon, Mar 11, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

Princeton/Warwick/Utah Political Economy Conference 2019

Sat, Mar 23, 2019 (All day) to Sun, Mar 24, 2019 (All day)

PEW: Gilat Levy

Mon, Mar 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Guido Tabellni

Mon, Apr 8, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Dorothy Kronick

Mon, Apr 15, 2019, 4:30 pm

PEW: Tim Besley

Tue, Apr 16, 2019, 4:30 pm

PEW: Melissa Dell

Mon, Apr 22, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall