PEW: Gerard Padro-i-Miquel

Mon, Oct 22, 2018, 4:30 pm

 We propose a simple informational theory to explain why autocratic regimes introduce local elections. Because citizens have better information on local officials than the distant central government, delegation of authority via local elections improves selection and performance of local officials. However, local officials under elections have no incentive to implement unpopular centrally mandated policies. The model makes several predictions: i) elections pose a trade-off between performance and vertical control; ii) elections improve the selection of officials; and iii) an increase in bureaucratic capacity reduces the desirability of elections for the autocrat. To test (i) and (ii), we collect a large village-level panel dataset from rural China. Consistent with the model, we find that elections improve (weaken) the implementation of popular (unpopular) policies, and improve official selection. We provide a large body of qualitative and descriptive evidence to support (iii). In doing so, we shed light on why the Chinese government has systematically undermined village governments twenty years after they were introduced.

Location: 

Upcoming

PEW: Gerard Padro-i-Miquel

Mon, Oct 22, 2018, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEC: Gleason Judd

Thu, Oct 25, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEW: Sergio Montero

Mon, Nov 5, 2018, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEC: Korhan Kocak

Thu, Nov 8, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEC: Maria Micaela Sviatschi

Thu, Nov 29, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEW: Laurent Bouton

Mon, Dec 3, 2018, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEC: Brendan Cooley

Thu, Dec 6, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEC: Federico Huneeus

Thu, Dec 13, 2018, 12:15 pm
Location: Fisher Hall 200

PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 11, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall

PEW: Edward Glaeser

Mon, Feb 25, 2019, 4:30 pm
Location: 127 Corwin Hall