PEW: John Duggan

Mon, Apr 26, 2021, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

We study the ability of elections to solve the dynamic programming problem of a representative voter in a dynamic citizen-candidate framework. We assume a finite number of states and general utilities and state transition probability, thereby allowing for non-trivial dynamics. We prove existence of equilibrium; we show that politicians may manipulate the state to affect their electoral prospects, resulting in suboptimal payoffs for the voter; and we show that for equilibria satisfying a responsive voting condition, equilibria become approximately optimal as the voter becomes patient.

Location: 
via Zoom

Upcoming

PE Research Seminar: Ephraim Shimko

Fri, Dec 10, 2021, 12:15 pm
Location: Wallace 300

PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 28, 2022, 4:15 pm

Princeton/Warwick/Utah Political Economy Conference 2022

Fri, Mar 11, 2022, 9:00 am to Sat, Mar 12, 2022, 5:00 pm
Location: Rome, Italy

PEW: Julia Cagé

Mon, Mar 14, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Bard Harstad

Mon, Mar 21, 2022, 4:15 pm

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Mon, Mar 21, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Helios Herrera

Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Marina Halac

Mon, Apr 18, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Tianyi Wang

Mon, Apr 25, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Gerard Padró i Miquel

Mon, May 2, 2022, 4:15 pm