This paper studies how an informed sender with state-independent preferences persuades receivers to approve his proposal with verifiable information. I find that every equilibrium outcome is characterized by each receiver’s set of approved states that satisfies this receiver’s obedience and the sender’s incentive-compatibility constraints. That allows me to describe the complete equilibrium set. In the sender-worst equilibrium, information unravels, and receivers act as if fully informed. The sender-preferred equilibrium outcome is the commitment outcome of the Bayesian persua- sion game. In the leading application, I study targeted advertising in elections and show that by communicating with voters privately, a challenger may win elections that are unwinnable with public disclosure. The more polarized the electorate, the more likely it is that the challenger swings an unwinnable election with targeted advertising.
PEW: María Titova
Mon, Sep 20, 2021, 4:15 pm