Can voting technology improve the integrity of elections in developing democracies? We study this question in the context of Bulgaria’s transition from paper ballots to machine voting -- a measure introduced with the goal of improving the accuracy of the election process and disrupting established practices of vote-buying and voter coercion. Our empirical strategy leverages a sharp discontinuity in the rule for the allocation of voting machines across polling stations and over-time variation in the implementation of machine voting. We document two main results. First, machine voting reduces the share of invalid votes, thereby increasing the probability that the votes cast count towards the electoral outcome. Second, machine voting causes a large and significant reduction in turnout, particularly in poor and rural areas. Decomposing this effect, we find that it driven entirely by a reduction in votes for parties with a local stronghold at baseline, while we find no change in votes for other parties.  We conduct representative surveys to further investigate mechanisms related to the prevention of vote-buying, as well as alternative mechanisms related to voters’ aversion to new technologies.