PEW: Ying Chen

Mon, Nov 30, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members withheterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in ex-change for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policypasses or paid up front. With transfer promises, a vote costs nearly zero.With up-front payments, a vote can cost significantly more than zero, butthe leader is better off with up-front payments. The leader does not neces-sarily buy the votes of those least opposed. The opposition structure mostchallenging to the leader involves either a homogeneous committee or a com-mittee with two homogenous groups. Our results provide an explanationfor several empirical regularities: lobbying of strongly opposed legislators,the Tullock Paradox and expansion of the whip system in the U.S. Houseconcurrent with ideological homogenization of parties.



PEW: Laurent Bouton

Mon, Dec 6, 2021, 4:15 pm
Location: 127 Corwin

PE Research Seminar: Ephraim Shimko

Fri, Dec 10, 2021, 12:15 pm
Location: Wallace 300

PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 28, 2022, 4:15 pm

Princeton/Warwick/Utah Political Economy Conference 2022

Fri, Mar 11, 2022, 9:00 am to Sat, Mar 12, 2022, 5:00 pm
Location: Rome, Italy

PEW: Julia Cagé

Mon, Mar 14, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Bard Harstad

Mon, Mar 21, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Ceren Baysan

Mon, Mar 21, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Helios Herrera

Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Marina Halac

Mon, Apr 18, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Tianyi Wang

Mon, Apr 25, 2022, 4:15 pm