Political Economy Workshop

The Political Economy Workshop meets Mondays, 4:15-5:30pm in Corwin 127. Some events this Fall semester are Zoom, please check the event details.  If you have questions, please contact the workshop organizers: Germán Gieczewski, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Matias Iaryczower.  To join the PEW-RPPE listserve for weekly announcements, please email Lindsay Woodrick

Upcoming Speaker Series Events

PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 28, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Julia Cagé

Mon, Mar 14, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Bard Harstad

Mon, Mar 21, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Ceren Baysan

Mon, Mar 21, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Helios Herrera

Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Marina Halac

Mon, Apr 18, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Tianyi Wang

Mon, Apr 25, 2022, 4:15 pm

PEW: Gerard Padró i Miquel

Mon, May 2, 2022, 4:15 pm

Past Events

PEW: Laurent Bouton

Mon, Dec 6, 2021, 4:15 pm

New online platforms have played a central role in political campaigns over the last decades by allowing small contributors to intervene in local and national electoral politics, and potentially mitigate the capture of the political process by large donors. Their impact has not yet been evaluated.

PEW: Claudio Ferraz

Mon, Nov 22, 2021, 4:15 pm

PEW: Patrick Francois

Mon, Oct 25, 2021, 4:15 pm

PEW: Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Mon, Oct 11, 2021, 4:15 pm

PEW: Dana Foarta

Mon, Oct 4, 2021, 4:15 pm

The operation of markets and of politics are in practice deeply intertwined. Politi- cal decisions set the rules of the game for market competition and, conversely, market competitors participate in and influence political decisions. We develop an integrated model to capture the circularity between the two domains.

PEW: Jon Eguía

Mon, Sep 27, 2021, 4:15 pm

Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Can we design a simple budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii) does not require unaffordable transfers, and iii) implements utilitarianism if agents’...

PEW: María Titova

Mon, Sep 20, 2021, 4:15 pm

This paper studies how an informed sender with state-independent preferences persuades receivers to approve his proposal with verifiable information. I find that every equilibrium outcome is characterized by each receiver’s set of approved states that satisfies this receiver’s obedience and the sender’s incentive-compatibility constraints.

PEW: Eliana La Ferrara

Mon, Sep 13, 2021, 4:15 pm

PEW: Monica Martinez-Bravo

Mon, May 10, 2021, 10:00 am to 11:15 am

This paper analyzes how changes in the concentration of political power affect long-run development. We study Brazil’s military dictatorship whose rise to power dramatically altered the distribution of power of local political elites.

PEW: John Duggan

Mon, Apr 26, 2021, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

We study the ability of elections to solve the dynamic programming problem of a representative voter in a dynamic citizen-candidate framework. We assume a finite number of states and general utilities and state transition probability, thereby allowing for non-trivial dynamics.