Political Economy Workshop

The Political Economy Workshop meets Mondays, 4:15-5:30pm in Corwin 127. Some events this Fall semester are Zoom, please check the event details.  If you have questions, please contact the workshop organizers: Germán Gieczewski, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Matias Iaryczower.  To join the PEW-RPPE listserve for weekly announcements, please email Lindsay Woodrick

Upcoming Speaker Series Events

PEW: Patrick Francois

Mon, Oct 25, 2021, 4:15 pm
Location: via Zoom
Speaker(s):

PEW: Claudio Ferraz

Mon, Nov 22, 2021, 4:15 pm
Location: via Zoom
Speaker(s):

PEW: Laurent Bouton

Mon, Dec 6, 2021, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Bard Harstad

Mon, Dec 13, 2021, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Alessandra Casella

Mon, Feb 28, 2022, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Julia Cagé

Mon, Mar 14, 2022, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Ceren Baysan

Mon, Mar 21, 2022, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Helios Herrera

Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Marina Halac

Mon, Apr 18, 2022, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Tiany Wang

Mon, Apr 25, 2022, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

PEW: Gerard Padró i Miquel

Mon, May 2, 2022, 4:15 pm
Speaker(s):

Past Events

PEW: Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Mon, Oct 11, 2021, 4:15 pm

PEW: Dana Foarta

Mon, Oct 4, 2021, 4:15 pm

The operation of markets and of politics are in practice deeply intertwined. Politi- cal decisions set the rules of the game for market competition and, conversely, market competitors participate in and influence political decisions. We develop an integrated model to capture the circularity between the two domains.

PEW: Jon Eguía

Mon, Sep 27, 2021, 4:15 pm

Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Can we design a simple budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii) does not require unaffordable transfers, and iii) implements utilitarianism if agents’...

PEW: María Titova

Mon, Sep 20, 2021, 4:15 pm

This paper studies how an informed sender with state-independent preferences persuades receivers to approve his proposal with verifiable information. I find that every equilibrium outcome is characterized by each receiver’s set of approved states that satisfies this receiver’s obedience and the sender’s incentive-compatibility constraints.

PEW: Eliana La Ferrara

Mon, Sep 13, 2021, 4:15 pm

PEW: Monica Martinez-Bravo

Mon, May 10, 2021, 10:00 am to 11:15 am

This paper analyzes how changes in the concentration of political power affect long-run development. We study Brazil’s military dictatorship whose rise to power dramatically altered the distribution of power of local political elites.

PEW: John Duggan

Mon, Apr 26, 2021, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

We study the ability of elections to solve the dynamic programming problem of a representative voter in a dynamic citizen-candidate framework. We assume a finite number of states and general utilities and state transition probability, thereby allowing for non-trivial dynamics.

PEW: Ken Shotts

Mon, Apr 19, 2021, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

We develop a model of electoral accountability with mainstream and alternative media. In addition to regular high- and low-competence types, the incumbent may be an aspiring autocrat who controls the mainstream media and will subvert democracy if retained in office. A truthful alternative media can help voters identify and remove these...

PEW: Keith Schnakenberg

Mon, Apr 12, 2021, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

Does motivated reasoning harm democratic accountability? Substantial evidence from political behavior research indicates that voters have "directional motives" beyond accuracy, which is often taken as evidence that they are ill-equipped to hold politicians accountable. We develop a model of electoral accountability with voters as motivated...

PEW: Caroline Le Pennec

Mon, Apr 5, 2021, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

Do campaign contributions influence politicians? In this article, we study the impact of corporate donations on ideology and political rhetoric among candidates running for parliamentary seats. We construct a novel dataset that combines candidate manifestos with data on the amount and origin of the donations received by all the candidates to...

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