Political Economy Workshop

The Political Economy Workshop meets Mondays, 4:30-6:00pm.  All sessions will meet in 127 Corwin Hall, unless otherwise noted. If you have questions, please contact the workshop organizers: Thomas Fujiwara and Matias Iaryczower.  To join the PEW-RPPE list serve for weekly announcements, please email Lindsay Woodrick

Upcoming Speaker Series Events

PEW: Matt Jackson

Mon, Sep 16, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Kristóf Madarasz

Mon, Sep 23, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Sara Lowes

Mon, Sep 30, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Karam Kang

Mon, Oct 14, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Nancy Qian

Mon, Nov 4, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Camilo García-Jimeno

Mon, Dec 2, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Raquel Fernandez

Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Vincent Pons

Mon, Feb 24, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Matt Gentzkow

Mon, Mar 2, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Marina Agranov

Mon, Mar 9, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Ying Chen

Mon, Mar 30, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Jeff Ely

Mon, Apr 13, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW: Federica Izzo

Mon, Apr 20, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

PEW : Jörg Spenkuch

Mon, Apr 27, 2020, 4:15 pm to 5:30 pm

Past Events

PEW: Horacio Larreguy

Mon, May 6, 2019, 4:30 pm

PEW: Erik Snowberg

Mon, Apr 29, 2019, 4:30 pm

PEW: Melissa Dell

Mon, Apr 22, 2019, 4:30 pm

Colonial powers typically organized economic activity in the colonies to maximize their economic returns. While the literature has emphasized long-run negative economic impacts via institutional quality, the changes in economic organization implemented to spur production historically could also directly influence economic organization in the...

PEW: Tim Besley

Tue, Apr 16, 2019, 12:45 pm

We develop a dynamic model of multi-dimensional politics to ex- plore how political cleavages, policies, and social identities interact over time. The model yields insights into the profound political changes we have witnessed around the world, as economic shocks and trend- wise breakdowns of traditional social hierarchies have reinvigorated...

PEW: Dorothy Kronick

Mon, Apr 15, 2019, 4:30 pm

Drug traffickers sometimes divide profits via peaceful agreement. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the state’s effort to enforce prohibition. Seizing illegal goods generally increases trafficker profits, and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted,...

PEW: Guido Tabellini

Mon, Apr 8, 2019, 4:30 pm

We present a theory of identity politics that builds on two ideas. First, voters identify with the social group whose interests are closest to theirs and that features the strongest policy con.ict with outgroups. Second, identification causes voters to slant their beliefs toward the group.s distinctive opinion.

PEW: Gilat Levy

Mon, Mar 25, 2019, 4:30 pm

We provide a novel rationale for why extreme forecasts are often more persuasive than moderate ones. We show that when people look for the most likely explanation of the views or opinions they observe, they will adopt an explanation according to which moderate views are just statistical derivatives of extreme views.

PEW: Juan Ortner

Mon, Mar 11, 2019, 4:30 pm

We construct a model of collective search in which players gradually approach the Pareto frontier. The players have imperfect control over which improvements to the status quo will be considered. Inefficiency takes place due to the difficulty in finding improvements acceptable to both parties. The process is path dependent, with early...

PEW: Monica Martinez-Bravo

Mon, Mar 4, 2019, 4:30 pm

This paper studies the effects of local political concentration on long-run economic development in Brazil. Contrary to what is observed in other contexts and time periods, we document that municipalities with higher levels of political concentration prior to Brazil's military dictatorship (1964-1985) achieved higher levels of development in...

PEW: Edward Glaeser

Mon, Feb 25, 2019, 4:30 pm

Many commercial transactions require trust, but trust is difficult when one group consistently fears expropriation by another group. If men have a comparative advantage at violence and there is little rule-of-law, then unequal bargaining power can lead women to segregate into industrial ghettos and even to avoid entrepreneurship altogether.