Political Economy Workshop

The Political Economy Workshop meets Mondays, 4:30-5:45pm in Corwin 127.  If you have questions, please contact the workshop organizers: Gleason Judd, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Matias Iaryczower.  To join the PEW-RPPE listserve for weekly announcements, please email Lindsay Woodrick

Upcoming Speaker Series Events

PEW: Davide Cantoni
Mon, Feb 13, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

Location
127 Corwin Hall
PEW: Robert Carroll
Mon, Feb 20, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

Location
127 Corwin Hall
PEW: Kei Kawai
Mon, Feb 27, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

Location
127 Corwin Hall
PEW: Andreas Kleiner
Mon, Apr 10, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

Location
127 Corwin Hall
PEW: Karam Kang
Mon, Apr 17, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

Location
127 Corwin Hall
PEW: Nina Bobkova
Mon, Apr 24, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

Location
127 Corwin Hall
PEW: Frederico Finan
Mon, May 1, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

PEW: Paola Giuliano
Mon, May 8, 2023, 4:30 pm

TBA

Location
127 Corwin Hall

Past Events

PEW: Edward Glaeser
Mon, Feb 25, 2019, 4:30 pm4:30 pm

Many commercial transactions require trust, but trust is difficult when one group consistently fears expropriation by another group. If men have a comparative advantage at violence and there is little rule-of-law, then unequal bargaining power can lead women to segregate into industrial ghettos and even to avoid entrepreneurship altogether. In…

PEW: Alessandra Casella
Mon, Feb 11, 2019, 4:30 pm4:30 pm

We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary issues. We prove that there always exists a stable allocation of votes that is reachable in a finite number of trades, for any number of voters and issues, any separable preference profile, and any restrictions on the coalitions that may form. If at every step all…

PEW: Laurent Bouton
Mon, Dec 3, 2018, 4:30 pm4:30 pm
PEW: Sergio Montero
Mon, Nov 5, 2018, 4:30 pm4:30 pm

Scholars of democratization have sought to understand two patterns: the observed correlation between income and democracy, and the clustering of democratization events. We develop and estimate a model of learning that explains both patterns. In our model, countries’ own and neighbors’ past experiences shape elites’ beliefs about the effects of…

PEW: Gerard Padro-i-Miquel
Mon, Oct 22, 2018, 4:30 pm4:30 pm

 We propose a simple informational theory to explain why autocratic regimes introduce local elections. Because citizens have better information on local officials than the distant central government, delegation of authority via local elections improves selection and performance of local officials. However, local officials under elections have…

PEW: Steven Callander
Mon, Oct 15, 2018, 4:30 pm4:30 pm
PEW: Georgy Egorov
Mon, Oct 1, 2018, 4:30 pm4:30 pm

A receiver wants to learn multidimensional information from a sender, but she has capacity to verify only one dimension. The sender’s payoff depends on the belief he induces, via an exogenously given monotone function. We show that by using a randomized verification strategy, the receiver can learn the sender’s information fully if the…

PEW: Cesi Cruz
Mon, Sep 24, 2018, 4:30 pm4:30 pm

In this paper we show that social fragmentation can trigger increased electoral competition and improved provision of public goods. We test this using large-scale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages of the Philippines. We take advantage of naming conventions to assess intermarriage links between families…

PEW: Bard Harstad
Mon, Sep 17, 2018, 4:30 pm4:30 pm

Inspired by the Paris Agreement on climate change, this paper analyzes a novel bargaining game in which each party quantifies its own contribution (to a public good, for example), before the set of pledges must be accepted. I first show that, if the tolerance for delay is uncertain, each equilibrium pledge coincides with an asymmetric Nash…

Francesco Trebbi, University of British Columbia
Mon, May 7, 2018, 4:30 pm6:00 pm

Making Policy Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises