The Common Priors Assumption: A Comment on 'Bargaining and the Nature of War'

TitleThe Common Priors Assumption: A Comment on 'Bargaining and the Nature of War'
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2006
AuthorsFey M, Ramsay KW
JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
Volume50
Issue4
Pagination - 613
Date PublishedAugust 2006
ISBN Number0022-0027, 0022-0027
KeywordsBargaining, Bargaining Theory, Matching Theory (C78), Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Alliances, Revolutions (D74), International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy: General (F50), National Security and War (H56), War
AbstractIn a recent article in this journal, Smith and Stam (2004) call into question the usefulness and applicability of what is know as the common priors assumption in the modeling of countries' strategic behavior in international relations. While the authors of this comment acknowledge that it is possible to incorporate noncommon priors in models of politics in a mathematically consistent fashion, they do not agree with the article's claims regarding the limitations of the common priors approach, which motivate Smith and Stam's rejection of it.
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