Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1979. “The Elusive Median Voter”. Journal of Public Economics 12: 143–170. Reference Link
Epple, Dennis, Radu Filimon, and Thomas Romer. 1984. “Equilibrium Among Local Jurisdictions: Toward an Integrated Treatment of Voting and Residential Choice”. Journal of Public Economics 24: 281–308. Reference Link
Romer, Thomas, Howard Rosenthal, and Vincent Munley. 1992. “Economic Incentives and Political Institutions: Spending and Voting in School Budget Referenda”. Journal of Public Economics 49: 1–33. Reference Link
Epple, Dennis, Radu Filimon, and Thomas Romer. 1993. “Existence of Voting and Housing Equilibrium in a System of Communities With Property Taxes”. Regional Science and Urban Economics 23: 585–610. Reference Link
Epple, Dennis, Thomas Romer, and Holger Sieg. 2001. “Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis”. Econometrica 69: 1437–1465. Reference Link
Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1982. “Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda”. Economic Inquiry 20: 556–578. Reference Link
Filimon, Radu, Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. 1982. “Asymmetric Information and Agenda Control: The Bases of Monopoly Power in Public Spending”. Journal of Public Economics 17: 51–70. Reference Link
Corcoran, Sean, Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. (2023) 2017. “The Twilight of the Setter? Public School Budgets in a Time of Institutional Change”. Economics and Politics 29: 1–21. doi:10.1111/ecpo.12087. Reference Link
Corcoran, Sean, Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. 2008. “The Troubled Quest for Equality in School Finance”. In What Do We Owe Each Other? Rights and Obligations in Contemporary American Society, 61–77. Referenced from www.taylorfrancis.com: The Troubled Quest for Equality in School Finance. Reference Link
Londregan, John, and Thomas Romer. 1993. “Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote”. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation, 355–377. Reference Link
Romer, Thomas. 1975. “Individual Welfare, Majority Voting, and the Properties of a Linear Income Tax”. Journal of Public Economics 4: 163–185. Reference Link
Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1979. “Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93: 563–587. Reference Link
Epple, Dennis, and Thomas Romer. 1991. “Mobility and Redistribution”. Journal of Political Economy 99: 828–858. Reference Link
