Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

TitleCoordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2006
AuthorsMailath GJ, Morris S
JournalTheoretical Economics
Volume1
Issue3
Pagination - 340
Date PublishedSeptember 2006
ISBN Number1933-6837, 1933-6837
KeywordsGames, Repeated Games, Stochastic and Dynamic Games, Evolutionary Games, Repeated Games (C73)
Abstract

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.

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