Corruption and Ideology in Autocracies

TitleCorruption and Ideology in Autocracies
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2015
AuthorsHollyer J, Wantchekon L
JournalJournal of law, economics, and organization
Volume31
Issue3
Pagination499
Date PublishedAugust 2015
ISBN Number8756-6222, 8756-6222
KeywordsBureaucracy, Corruption in government, Ideology, Moral hazard, Political behavior, Rwanda, South Korea, Studies
AbstractCorruption is usually depicted in one of two ways: as stemming from a lack of government accountability, or from a lack of capacity. Neither depiction predicts that the structure of institutions meant to control corruption should vary across autocratic regimes. If corruption results from moral hazard between politicians and citizens, then all unaccountable governments should eschew anticorruption bodies. If rent-seeking stems from moral hazard between politicians and bureaucrats, all governments should create anticorruption bodies. We offer an explanation for why unaccountable governments vary in their willingness to create anticorruption institutions. Autocrats create such bodies to deter ideologically disaffected members of the populace from entering the bureaucracy. Anticorruption institutions act as a commitment by the elite to restrict the monetary benefits from bureaucratic office, thus ensuring that only zealous supporters of the elite will pursue bureaucratic posts. We illustrate these arguments with case studies of South Korea and Rwanda. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press
URLhttps://search.proquest.com/docview/1866652548?accountid=13314