Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

TitleInformation Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsBergemann D, Morris S
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Pagination - 591
Date PublishedMay 2016
ISBN Number0002-8282, 0002-8282
KeywordsAsymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design (D82), Equilibrium, Information, Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge, Communication, Belief, Unawareness (D83)
AbstractA set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.