Judicial lobbying: The politics of labor law constitutional interpretation

TitleJudicial lobbying: The politics of labor law constitutional interpretation
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2006
AuthorsIaryczower M, Spiller P, Tommasi M
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Volume100
Pagination85–97
ISSN00030554
ISBN Number0003-0554
AbstractThis paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the$\backslash$nlegislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The$\backslash$nresulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying$\backslash$nwith the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over$\backslash$nlegislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in$\backslash$nseparation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial$\backslash$ndecisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that$\backslash$nlobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant$\backslash$nissues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions$\backslash$nin Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the$\backslash$ntheory.
DOI10.1017/S0003055406062022
PubMed ID14018837