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The rational design of international institutions

Author
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, Duncan Snidal, Andrew Kydd, B Peter Rosendorff, Helen Milner, Robert Pahre, Ronald Mitchell, Patricia Keilbach, Walter Mattli, Thomas Oatley, James Morrow, John Richards, Alexander Wendt
Publication Year
2001

Type

Journal Article
Keywords
Game theory, Economics, Diplomacy, Bargaining, War, International Security, Conflict resolution, Prisoners of war, Trade policy, International Relations, International law, Trade agreements, Foreign Policy, International agreements, Trust, International organizations, Centralization, Trade negotiations, International relations theory, Law of war, Peace keeping
Journal
International organization
Volume
55
Issue
4
Pages
- 1103
Date Published
Oct 2001
ISBN
0020-8183, 0020-8183
URL
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