Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade

TitleReplication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2002
AuthorsMansfield ED, Milner HV, B Rosendorff P
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Pagination - 169
Date PublishedMarch 2002
ISBN Number0003-0554, 0003-0554
Keywords9063: international relations; international relations, article, Decision making, Foreign Policy, International Relations, International trade, Political Systems, Realism
AbstractOur earlier article established that pairs of democracies trade more freely than country-pairs composed of a democracy & an autocracy (Mansfield, Milner, & Rosendorff 2000). Xinyuan Dai (2002) incorrectly asserts that our conclusion depends on the preferences of the decision makers who formulate trade policy. We show that Dai fails to accurately replicate our model, & hence erroneously claims that the new equilibria she deduces are consistent with it. In addition, we demonstrate that in altering one of our assumptions, Dai offers a model that is less realistic as well as inconsistent with the substantive literature on international bargaining. Finally, we question the robustness of her approach. Due to these problems of replication, realism, & robustness, we conclude that Dai's model is of limited utility. 1 Figure, 5 References. Adapted from the source document.