Uncertainty and incentives in crisis bargaining: game-free analysis of international conflict

TitleUncertainty and incentives in crisis bargaining: game-free analysis of international conflict
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2011
AuthorsFey M, Ramsay KW
JournalAmerican journal of political science
Volume55
Issue1
Pagination - 169
Date PublishedJan 2011
ISBN Number0092-5853, 0092-5853
KeywordsBargaining power, Conflict resolution, Cost analysis, International conflicts, Material incentives, Peace agreement, Peace research, Political crises, Political equilibrium, Political Science, Uncertainty
AbstractWe study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict. Among our results, we show that under some weak conditions, there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war. We also show that while uncertainty about the other side's cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations, uncertainty about the other side's strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes. Along the way, we are able to assess the degree to which particular modelling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well-known relationship between uncertainty, the incentive to misrepresent, and costly war. We find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions, whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important. Adapted from the source document. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers
URLhttps://search.proquest.com/docview/861587113?accountid=13314