Vetoing co-operation: the impact of veto players on preferential trading arrangements

TitleVetoing co-operation: the impact of veto players on preferential trading arrangements
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2007
AuthorsMansfield ED, Milner HV, Pevehouse JC
JournalBritish journal of political science
Volume37
Issue3
Pagination - 432
Date PublishedJul 2007
ISBN Number0007-1234, 0007-1234
KeywordsEconomics, Economics and politics, International Cooperation, International economics, Political actors, Political Science, Statistical models, Trade agreements, Trade policy, Veto
AbstractSince the Second World War, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the international economic system. A great deal of research has addressed the economic consequences of these arrangements, but far less effort has been made to identify the political factors leading states to enter them. In this article, the domestic political factors affecting whether countries enter PTAs are investigated, placing particular emphasis on the number of veto players within a state. It is argued that the probability of forming a PTA declines as the number of such players rises. The results, covering 194 countries from 1950 to 1999, strongly support this argument. Holding various political and economic factors constant, increasing the number of veto players within a country significantly reduces the probability of signing a PTA. Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press. An electronic version of this article can be accessed via the internet at http://journals.cambridge.org
URLhttps://search.proquest.com/docview/36690031?accountid=13314